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MEPHISTO called our attention to the fact that it was THOMAS' uncritical
adherence to a presupposition common to every variety of Fregean semantics--that
the meaning of a sentence remains constant when a singular term is substituted
for another with the same meaning--which led him to conclude, from
the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus and cognitive distinctness of Hesperus
is Phosphorus and Hesperus is Hesperus, that the customary reference
of Hesperus and Phosphorus plays no role in the meaning of Hesperus
is Phosphorus and Hesperus is Hesperus. What MEPHISTO was unable to
do, thanks to a less than timely intervention on the part of THE VOICE,
was explain what it is about the customary reference of Hesperus and
Phosphorus that makes Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus
cognitively distinct. What is it, then, about the customary reference of
singular terms which causes assertions of formal and material identity
so to misbehave? Contra countless journal articles which take their
cue from turn-of-the-century writings by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell,
my account of what sets such assertions apart will not evoke the language
in which these are cast. Instead the point of departure for my account
of the fall of Frege's Principle will be a less-than-modern view of identity
and the entities it relates. |
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